The Delhi High Court, on Tuesday, issued a notice to Delhi Chief Minister Atishi Marlena in response to a petition filed by BJP leader Praveen Shankar Kapoor.
The petition challenges the rejection of a defamation case against Atishi, which stemmed from her allegations that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) attempted to induce defections among Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) legislators.
Justice Vikas Mahajan presided over the matter, stating, “Issue notice to the respondent.”
Kapoor’s legal counsel contended that the revisional court had acted ultra vires by dismissing the defamation complaint and quashing the summons issued by a magisterial court, which had originally mandated Atishi’s trial.
He further objected to the revisional court’s characterization of Atishi as a whistleblower, arguing that such judicial observations were unwarranted and should be expunged.
The complaint, filed by Kapoor in his capacity as a former media head and spokesperson of the Delhi BJP unit, alleges that Atishi, during press conferences on January 27 and April 2, 2024, made unfounded accusations.
Specifically, she claimed that BJP representatives were offering bribes ranging from Rs 20-25 crore to AAP MLAs in an effort to engineer political realignments.
In response to the summons initially issued against her by the magisterial court, Atishi pursued legal recourse through a revision petition before a special judge. The original complaint had also implicated former Delhi Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal; however, the magisterial court, in its ruling dated May 28, 2024, determined that there was insufficient prima facie evidence to proceed against him.
The court has scheduled the matter for its next hearing in April, ensuring further judicial scrutiny.
Previously, on January 28, Special Judge Vishal Gogne ruled that Atishi’s statements constituted an exercise of the fundamental right to free speech, particularly in the context of political corruption, rather than an instance of defamation.
The court further held that the pre-summoning evidentiary record did not substantiate the necessity of summoning Atishi as an accused party.
This legal dispute highlights the intersection of political discourse and defamation jurisprudence, reflecting broader tensions regarding the permissibility of allegations of corruption within the ambit of free speech.
The case is poised to establish a precedent in defining the contours of political accountability and the legal threshold for defamation claims in the realm of electoral politics.
