The Supreme Court of India has recently ruled that the mere existence of disputed questions of fact does not preclude a High Court from granting appropriate relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.
A Bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan observed that the State frequently relies on the argument that the presence of disputed facts limits the High Court’s writ jurisdiction, a stance the Court described as a “stock argument.”
The apex court clarified that when a State raises such contentions merely to reject a plea, the writ court must evaluate the disputed facts and make determinations based on the available record.
“Ordinarily, writ courts do not adjudicate disputed questions of fact under Article 226. However, the mere presence of such disputes does not strip the High Court of its jurisdiction. Where it is evident that the State has invoked this argument solely to obstruct judicial scrutiny, the writ court must dismiss such objections and assess the factual matrix of the case,” the Supreme Court stated.
The Bench further emphasized that nothing in Article 226 restricts the High Court from conducting inquiries where necessary.
“The proposition that a writ petition must be dismissed simply because disputed facts exist is not mandated by any provision of law or Supreme Court precedent. Rigidly applying such a principle would render Article 226 ineffective,” the Court noted.
The extent to which the High Court should intervene would depend on the nature of the factual dispute, the Court added.
Background
These observations were made in a case involving two appeals filed by AP Electrical Equipment Corporation, which contested a 2022 judgment by the High Court for the State of Telangana and Hyderabad.
The appellant company, engaged in manufacturing and selling electrical equipment, had acquired 1,63,764 square yards of land in Fatehnagar, Rangareddy district, Telangana. Following the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act), the company submitted a declaration of its land holdings, with part of the land receiving exemption from ceiling laws under government orders.
However, the State later withdrew some of these exemptions, citing non-compliance with industrial development conditions. Specifically, the government claimed the company had failed to construct housing units for economically weaker sections as mandated under Section 21 of the ULC Act. Consequently, the State declared the land surplus, and the Special Officer (Urban Land Ceiling) initiated acquisition proceedings, allegedly taking possession via a panchnama (a formal record of search and seizure) in February 2008.
The company contested this acquisition, arguing that the government had never taken actual physical possession of the land and that the panchnama was fabricated after the ULC Act was repealed in 1999.
Legal Proceedings and Supreme Court Ruling
A Single Judge of the High Court ruled in favor of the company in 2022, concluding that the government had failed to follow due process and that the alleged panchnama was backdated and fabricated after the repeal of the ULC Act. However, the State government appealed this ruling, and a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the decision. It held that the government had lawfully issued acquisition notices under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the ULC Act and that possession had been legally taken through the panchnama.
Dissatisfied with the Division Bench’s ruling, the company appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court found that the State had failed to establish proper service of notices under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act, rendering the acquisition invalid. It also rejected the High Court’s finding that there was no statutory requirement to obtain the landowner’s signature on the panchnama.
“When State authorities attempt to bypass legal procedures and rely on fraudulent panchnamas to assert that possession was taken before the repeal of the ULC Act, it becomes imperative to obtain the landowner’s signature to ensure the legitimacy of the process. Affidavits from independent witnesses would also lend credibility,” the Court stated.
The Supreme Court also criticized the language used by the Division Bench in its ruling.
“We have noticed that the Division Bench repeatedly used the phrase ‘shockingly the learned Single Judge’ in its judgment. We fail to understand what was so shocking in the Single Judge’s ruling that warranted such language. Was the Division Bench deciding a criminal appeal against a conviction? An intra-court appeal is merely a review by a coordinate bench, and one High Court bench cannot issue a writ against another,” the Court remarked.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed both appeals, set aside the Division Bench’s order, and restored the Single Judge’s ruling in favor of AP Electrical Equipment Corporation.
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